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THE PARTHIAN RIVAL AND ROME’S FAILURE  
IN THE EAST:  
ROMAN PROPAGANDA AND THE STAIN OF CRASSUS
Summary: The consequences of Crassus’ invasion of Mesopotamia in 54–53 BCE were unanticipated 
and unintended; however, his disastrous failure shocked the Roman world and suddenly established the 
Parthians as a serious rival to Rome. Moreover, the shame the Romans felt after the Battle of Carrhae 
was considerable. The battle scarred the Roman psyche and severely damaged the Roman ego. This study 
synthesizes and investigates what became a vicious and virulent Roman literary tradition of anti-Crassus 
propaganda, examining how numerous Roman writers over the course of numerous centuries used the 
dead and disgraced Crassus as a convenient scapegoat to help explain Rome’s failure to dominate the East 
and subdue the Parthian rival. It demonstrates that these writers ignored the legitimate causes for the First 
Romano-Parthian War (56 BCE – 1 CE), which Crassus had inherited, and illustrates that the disaster at 
Carrhae became a popular moralizing lesson about the consequences of greed, impiety, and hubris.
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On a warm, dry day in early May of 53 BCE about 45,000 Roman soldiers and auxil-
iaries faced a force of 10,000 battle-hardened Parthian cavalrymen across the rolling 
fields of Carrhae in northern Mesopotamia. The Roman commander, Marcus Licinius 
Crassus, who was the triumviral partner of Julius Caesar and Pompey Magnus, had 
been allotted an eastern command that included the responsibility of concluding the 
first ever open conflict between Rome and Parthia. Crassus was trying to bring a swift 
end to a conflict that had begun when his proconsular predecessor, Aulus Gabinius, 
had used the pretext of a Parthian civil conflict to involve himself in the eastern king-
dom’s affairs.
Crassus found himself facing the Parthian king Orodes II’s most accomplished 
general, Surenas, near the small town of Carrhae, not far from the source of the Balikh 
River. This was the first time Roman and Parthian soldiers had met in a major conflict, 
and neither side knew what to expect. Suddenly a low and distant rumbling became 
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an increasingly terrifying cacophony of drums and war cries as the Parthian army 
emerged from its well-placed concealed positions. Almost immediately the surprised 
Romans formed a defensive formation and lost the initiative in the battle. The more 
maneuverable and flexible Parthian cavalry relentlessly harassed the stationary Roman 
infantry huddled in easily fixed targets for the Parthian horse archers, and any Roman 
breakout attempts were met by the thunderous charge of the heavily armored Parthian 
cataphracts. Finally, in desperation Crassus ordered his son, Publius, with the majority 
of the available Roman cavalry to attack the Parthian force to drive it from the field. 
At first Publius’ charge appeared to have accomplished its goal as the Parthian 
cavalry turned and fled; however, the Romans were unaware that this “rout” was in 
reality a calculated feigned retreat meant to draw Publius’ force away from the main 
Roman army so that it could be destroyed in detail. Publius unknowingly fell directly 
into this trap and did not recognize his vulnerable position until it was too late. The 
Parthians quickly surrounded and massacred Publius and about 5,000 men. 
Crassus, who was busy trying to reorganize his army, had no idea that his son 
had committed suicide as his men were slaughtered around him until the Parthian 
army reappeared brandishing Publius’ severed head as a war trophy. The morale of 
Crassus and his men plummeted as the relentless Parthian assault resumed. Completely 
isolated, immobile, and outgunned, the Roman army found itself corralled by the 
crushing charges of the Parthian cataphracts and picked apart by an endless storm of 
arrows. Only nightfall saved the Roman army from complete annihilation on that day. 
In the battle and the subsequent retreat to Syria, Crassus lost about 30,000 men, 
a third of whom the Parthians captured and sent to the eastern frontier of their empire. 
Crassus too was a casualty of his failed expedition. In a meeting with Surenas, where the 
two men hoped to discuss terms for a truce, a struggle erupted and Crassus was killed. 
Similar to his son, Crassus’ head was removed and used as a victory marker. The Par-
thians had demonstrated emphatically that they were a military match for the Romans.1
The consequences of Crassus’ invasion were unanticipated and unintended; how-
ever, his failure shocked the Roman world and suddenly established the Parthians as 
a serious rival to Rome. Moreover, the shame the Romans felt after the Battle of Car-
rhae was considerable. The battle scarred the Roman psyche and severely damaged 
the Roman ego. This study synthesizes and investigates what became a vicious and 
virulent Roman literary tradition of anti-Crassus propaganda, examining how numer-
ous Roman writers over the course of numerous centuries used the dead and disgraced 
Crassus as a convenient scapegoat to help explain Rome’s failure to dominate the East 
and subdue the Parthian rival. It demonstrates that these writers ignored the legitimate 
1 For Parthian militarism and the Romano-Parthian rivalry, see OvertOOm, N. L.: Challenging 
Roman Domination: The End of Hellenistic Rule and the Rise of the Parthian State from the Third to 
the First Centuries BCE. Baton Rouge 2016; OvertOOm, N. L.: The Rivalry of Rome and Parthia in 
the Sources from the Augustan Age to Late Antiquity. Anabasis, Studia Classica et Orientalia 7 (2016) 
137–174; OvertOOm, N. L.: The Power-Transition Crisis of the 240s BCE and the Creation of the Par-
thian State. The International History Review 38.5 (2016) 984–1013; OvertOOm, N. L.: The Parthians’ 
Unique Mode of Warfare: A Tradition of Parthian Militarism and the Battle of Carrhae. Anabasis, Studia 
Classica et Orientalia 8 (2017).
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causes for the First Romano-Parthian War (56 BCE – 1 CE) that Crassus had inherited 
and illustrates that the disaster at Carrhae became a popular moralizing lesson about 
the consequences of greed, impiety, and hubris.2
THE LITERARY TRADITION OF CRITICIZING ROMAN FAILURE  
IN THE EAST
Most ancient and modern criticism of Crassus for conducting a major campaign against 
the Parthians is misplaced and results-based.3 In reality, Crassus was hardly unique or 
controversial in his conduct during his command prior to his defeat in the East. Sev-
eral Roman generals by this period had conducted self-fulfilling and self-aggrandizing 
foreign campaigns that were either in the technical sense illegal or at the very least 
a generous overstepping of their official commands.4 The conquests of Pompey and 
Caesar, just to pick two corresponding examples, are remembered quite differently in 
our sources mainly because they were vastly successful. Yet in the case of Crassus, not 
only did he face contemporary opposition from the senate, which did not want another 
great Roman statesman to gain considerable influence at its further expense, he also 
2 Plutarch finds Crassus’ Carrhae campaign a suitable parallel to the disastrous Athenian invasion 
of Sicily by Nicias. Plut. Nic. 1. 1. Plutarch refers to the Carrhae campaign as a great blunder. Plut. Crass. 
17. 4.
3 Gareth Sampson has made a recent attempt to reevaluate and recover Crassus’ reputation. He 
argues, “For too long, the Parthians have been seen as nothing more than a one dimensional enemy whom 
Crassus lost to through his own incompetence; and a defeat which had little wider effect. However, such a 
view is merely the legacy of wounded Roman pride.” SampSON, G. C.: The Defeat of Rome: Crassus, Car-
rhae and the Invasion of the East. Barnsley 2015, xvi, 56, 79–80, 83–85, 92, 95, 109–110, 169–175. Note 
also marShaLL, B. a.: Crassus: A Political Biography. Amsterdam 1976, 143, 147–148; Ward, a. m.: 
Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic. Columbia 1977, 1–4, 290–295; LerOuGe, C.: L’image 
des Parthes dans le monde gréco-romain: Du début du Ier siècle av. J.-C. jusqu’à la fin du Haut-Empire 
romain. Stuttgart 2007, 71. For modern bias toward Crassus, note esp. drumaNN, W.: Geschichte Roms. 
Ed. P. Groebe. 2. Aufl. Bd. 4. Berlin–Leipzig 1908, 123; heitLaNd, W. e.: The Roman Republic. Vol. 
3. Cambridge 1909, 238; GeLzer, m.: Licinius Crassus (68). PWRE 13.1 (1926) 296. 7–14; Cary, m.: 
A History of Rome down to the Reign of Constantine. 2nd ed. London 1954, 366; FerrerO, G.: The Life 
of Caesar. Trans. A. E. Zimmern. New York 1962, 91; meier, C.: Res Publica Amissa. Wiesbaden 1966, 
274–275; GraNt, m.: Julius Caesar. London 1969, 44–45; Cary, m. – SCuLLard, h. h.: A History of 
Rome down to the Reign of Constantine. 3rd ed. London 1975, 243; KeaveNey, a.: The King and the War-
Lords: Romano-Parthian Relations Circa 64–53 B.C. The American Journal of Philology 103.4 (1982) 
423, 428; SherWiN-White, a. N.: Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 B.C. to A.D. 1. Norman 1984, 
280–281;  ChahiN, m.: The Kingdom of Armenia. New York 1987, 242–243; GOLdSWOrthy, a.: Antony 
and Cleopatra. New Haven 2010, 105–106. In a moment of outstanding literary irony, Plutarch, who al-
most universally portrays Crassus negatively in the last few years of Crassus’ life because of the Carrhae 
disaster, states in his brief comparison of Crassus to the Athenian general Nicias, “Those who have praise 
for Alexander’s expedition, but blame for that of Crassus, unfairly judge of a beginning by its end.” Plut. 
Nic. and Crass. 4. 5. Plutarch then continues, “But Crassus made so many blunders that he gave fortune no 
chance to favor him. We may not therefore wonder that his imbecility succumbed to the power of the Par-
thians, but rather that it prevailed over the usual good fortune of the Romans.” Plut. Nic. and Crass. 5. 1.
4 Gnaeus Manlius Vulso (189 BCE), Manius Aquillius (88 BCE), Lucius Licinius Murena 
(83 BCE), Lucius Licinius Lucullus (69 BCE), Gnaeus Pompey (65–62 BCE), Julius Caesar (58–49 BCE), 
and Aulus Gabinius (56–55 BCE) are all good examples.
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earned the harsh criticism of centuries of Roman writers. After all, Roman propaganda 
had every motive to distance the reputation of Rome from the disaster at Carrhae. 
In late 56 BCE, prior to the appointment of Crassus to his Syrian command in 
55 BCE, the Romans committed to becoming involved in an ongoing Parthian civil 
war, which was taking place in Mesopotamia and Media. Aulus Gabinius, the Roman 
governor of Syria who preceded Crassus, accepted the plea of Mithridates IV – the 
ousted Parthian king – for support in his civil war against his brother Orodes II.5 
Although Gabinius never attacked Orodes before Crassus replaced him as governor of 
Syria, Gabinius’ decision to intervene in the conflict officially began the First Roma-
no-Parthian War. Yet the propagandistic literary tradition surrounding Crassus almost 
universally ignores the fact that Gabinius already had committed Rome to a Parthian 
war before Crassus’ appointment to his Syrian command and disregards that Crassus 
actually had every reason to pursue this legitimate conflict and end it during his com-
mand in the East. Since in reality Crassus inherited an ongoing and legitimate conflict, 
it was Crassus’ failure and particularly his death that made the anti-Crassus propagan-
distic tradition possible. Let us discuss some of the examples of this tradition so that 
we may recognize this biased and unrealistic depiction of Crassus and his campaign.
The Romans in general found military defeat in the East unacceptable and 
blamed such setbacks on their unfortunate generals. The greedy, violent, or irreligious 
Roman commander, who was weak of character and who eventually failed in the East, 
was a common literary trope. For instance, there are the accounts of the failure and 
death of Manius Aquillius, who was a commander in Asia Minor during the First 
Mithridatic War, in 88 BCE.6 Then there are the accounts of Lucius Licinius Lucullus, 
whom the sources criticize for his inability to end the conflict against Mithridates VI 
and Tigranes II in the early 60s BCE.7 Similarly, the sources criticize Gabinius for 
his actions in the East from 57–55 BCE.8 Note also how the sources offer praise of 
Publius Ventidius Bassus for his defense of Syria against the Parthians in the early 30s 
BCE and contrast that praise with criticism of Mark Antony’s envy and his military 
failures in the East only a couple of years later.9 Moreover, there is the tradition of 
the ineptitude of the general Lucius Caesennius Paetus in Armenia, which led to the 
Roman disaster at Rhandeia in 62 CE.10 
Roman emperors were not immune to harsh criticism of unsuccessful actions 
in the East or failed eastern policy. Later Roman writers blamed Hadrian’s envy of 
Trajan’s success against the Parthians for his abandonment of Trajan’s eastern gains 
and criticized Hadrian for his weakness in making this decision.11 Later Roman writ-
ers also indirectly associated the inappropriate boasting and military shortcomings of 
 5 Note Appian Syr. 8. 51; Dio 39. 56. 2; Jos. Ant. 14. 98; Jos. Bell. 1. 175; Justin 42. 4. 1–4.
 6 Appian Mithr. 3. 21; 16. 112; Pliny 33. 14. 48; 47. 134; Athen. 5. 50; Diod. 37. 26–27; Vell. Pat. 
2. 18; Cic. Man. 4. 11; Cic. Tusc. 5. 5, 14.
 7 Dio 36. 2. 1–2; 14. 4 – 15. 1; 17. 1, 46; 37. 7. 1; Appian Mithr. 13. 90; Plut. Luc. 35–36.
 8 Appian Syr. 8. 51; Cic. Prov. 9–11; Cic. Pis. 41–43; 48–52; Cic. Sest. 93.
 9 Plut. Ant. 30, 33–35, 38–50; Dio 49. 19–21; Florus 2. 19–20. Note LerOuGe (n. 3) 310–313.
10 Tac. Ann. 15. 1–17, 24; Dio 62. 21. See also Orosius 7. 7.
11 Ruf. Fest. 14. 4–5; 20. 3; Eutrop. 8. 3.
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Caracalla in the East, fighting against the Parthians, with Crassus’ disaster at Carrhae.12 
Macrinus, too, found censure for his failures in the East.13 Further, Herodian consid-
ered Severus Alexander’s policy in the East weak and unsuccessful, which led Hero-
dian to compare Severus Alexander’s missteps to the defeats of Crassus and Antony.14 
There was criticism of Philip the Arab’s arrogance in the East.15 Roman writers 
found the humiliating defeat and capture of Valerian near Edessa in 260 CE unaccept-
able.16 Roman writers also juxtaposed the shameful actions of Gallienus in the East 
with the decisive actions of the king of Palmyra, Odaenathus.17 
Even emperors who initially had found success in the East endured reproach once 
their endeavors lost momentum. Aurelius Victor describes Carus, who briefly captured 
the old Parthian capital, Ctesiphon, in 283 CE, as a successful leader until he became 
too reckless in the East and ignored divine warnings.18 Further, there is a tradition of 
criticizing Julian, whose apparent violent desire for glory overwhelmed him and made 
him overlook the “numerous presages through which he was being forbidden to attack 
Persia.”19 Finally, there was almost universal criticism of Jovian’s humiliating eastern 
concessions, following Julian’s sudden death on the battlefield in Mesopotamia.20 
With all of these examples in mind, an important characteristic of the Roman lit-
erary tradition that developed around the longstanding Roman rivalry with the Arsacid 
Parthians and Sassanid Persians was the Romans’ unwillingness to accept their own 
military and imperial limitations in the East. In this tradition, failure in the East was 
the result of poor leadership and moral character, not a deficiency of the Roman army 
or state. Numerous Roman statesmen found their legacies marred by criticism of their 
shortcomings in the East; however, Crassus became the most popular example.
THE ANTI-CRASSUS PROPAGANDISTIC TRADITION
Roman writers developed and utilized two primary literary tropes to dismantle the 
reputation of Crassus for centuries in order to explain his missteps in the East and to 
absolve the Roman state of his failure: Crassus’ alleged insatiable greed and his alleged 
12 HA Carac. 6. 4–6; Herodian 4. 11, 13–14; Orosius 7. 18. See also Dio 78. 3–5; Ruf. Fest. 21. 3; 
Eutrop. 8. 20; Orosius 7. 18. Note heKSter, O. – Kaizer, t.: An Accidental Tourist? Caracalla’s Fatal 
Trip to the Temple of the Moon at Carrhae/Harran. Ancient Society 42 (2012) 89–107.
13 Dio 78. 26. 2 – 27. 2; Herodian 4. 15; HA Macr. 8.
14 Herodian 6. 5–6; 8. 3.
15 HA Gord. 29. 1; 30.1.
16 Ruf. Fest. 23. 1; Eutrop. 9. 7; Aur. Vic. Epit. Caes. 32; Orosius 7. 22; Lact. Mort. Pers. 5, 9; Zos. 
1. 20. Note also HA Valer. 1. 1 – 4. 4.
17 HA Gall. 10. 1–3; 12. 1, 6; 13. 4–5; HA Tyrranni 15; 30. 6; HA Valer. 4; Orosius 7. 22.
18 Aur. Vic. Caes. 38. Rufus Festus records that the “Celestial Divinity” became jealous of Carus’ 
success against the Persians and, therefore, struck him down with lightning. Ruf. Fest. 24. 2. Note also 
Eutrop. 9. 18–19.
19 Aur. Vic. Epit. Caes. 43. 8. See also Amm. Mar. 23. 2; 5. 4; Ruf. Fest. 28; Eutrop. 10. 16; Orosius 
7. 30. Orosius portrays Theodosius I as an avenger of Julian. Orosius 7. 34.
20 Ruf. Fest. 29; Eutrop. 10. 17; Amm. Mar. 25. 7. Note also Orosius 7. 31.
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hubristic irreverence. The harsh criticisms of later Roman statesmen and emperors for 
their failures in the East in many ways originated in the anti-Crassus propagandistic 
tradition that emerged in the post-Carrhae Roman world. Yet no other Roman states-
man became the victim of such a popular and universally critical literary tradition.
The initial problem that the image of Crassus faced was that both he and his 
well-respected son, Publius, died during the Carrhae campaign. Thus, Crassus died 
without an apologist to take up his cause; however, his subordinate, Cassius, who was 
highly critical of Crassus’ failure, survived the conflict. It is highly likely that Cassius 
wrote a report of the campaign that portrayed himself flatteringly and blamed the fail-
ure on Crassus.21 This biased initial framing of the conversation about the Carrhae cam-
paign heavily influenced the later anti-Crassus tradition. For example, Plutarch records, 
But now, contrary to their hopes [of swift victory], they [the Roman sol-
diers] were led to expect a struggle and great peril. Therefore, some of 
the officers thought that Crassus ought to call a halt and reconsider the 
whole undertaking. Among these was Cassius, the quaestor. The seers, 
also, quietly let it become known that the omens for Crassus, which came 
from their sacrifices, were always bad and inauspicious. But Crassus paid 
no heed to them, nor to those who advised anything else except to press 
forward.22
Here we see that in this portrayal of events Cassius offered good advice, which the 
impious, careless, and brash Crassus ignored. Plutarch also argues that Cassius gave 
sound advice that Crassus ignored on several other occasions, and Plutarch portrays 
Cassius as brave and decisive in battle while Crassus appears mostly weak and hes-
itant.23 Yet Plutarch is not the only offender. For example, Appian states, “Thus in a 
marvelous manner Cassius came into possession of twelve first-rate legions, to whom 
were added a certain number of Parthian mounted bowmen, who were attracted by the 
reputation he had acquired among them from the time when, as quaestor to Crassus, 
he had shown himself to be more skillful than that general.”24 Meanwhile, a simulta-
neous tradition developed that portrayed Cassius as a savior and avenger of Rome. For 
instance, Vellius Paterculus argues, “Remnants of the legions were saved by Gaius 
Cassius – (he was later the perpetrator of a most atrocious crime, but was at that time 
quaestor) – who not only retained Syria in its allegiance to the Roman people, but 
succeeded, by a fortunate issue of events, in defeating and putting to rout the Parthians 
when they crossed its borders.”25 Moreover, previously in this section Velleius blames 
21 Ward (n. 3) 295 n. 25; SherWiN-White (n. 3) 281.
22 Plut. Crass. 18. 4–5. See also Plut. Crass.  17. 6; 19. 3–6.
23 Plut. Crass.  20. 2; 22. 4; 23. 3, 5; 27. 5; 28. 3–5. See also Dio 40. 26–29. Plutarch also empha-
sized Crassus’ old age as a handicap. Plut. Crass. 17. 1–2; 18. 1; 19. 6.
24 Appian BC 4. 59. See also Dio 47. 30. 3.
25 Vell. Pat. 2. 46. 4. Note also Cic. Phil. 11. 14; Plut. Brut. 7. 3; 43. 7–8; Jos. Ant. 14. 119; Jos. 
Bell. 1. 180–182; Livy Epit. 108. 2; Orosius 6. 13. Justin’s account is slightly less flattering to Cassius. 
Justin 42. 4. 5.
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Crassus’ failure on his lustfulness for gold and glory and wishes that only Crassus 
had died in the East because, as Velleius peculiarly claims, Crassus’ death in isolation 
would have been advantageous to the Roman state.26
As touched upon by Velleius, Roman writers especially emphasized the vices 
of greed and impiety to emphasize the apparent moral weakness of Crassus. Josephus 
connected Crassus’ violation of the temple of Jerusalem and his looting of its wealth 
directly to the destruction of his army and his death.27 Pliny the Elder writes, 
M. Crassus, a member of the same family, used to say that no man was 
rich, who could not maintain a legion upon his yearly income. He pos-
sessed in land two hundred millions of sesterces, being the richest Roman 
citizen next to Sulla. Nor was even this enough for him, but he must want 
to possess all the gold of the Parthians too! And yet, although he was the 
first to become memorable for his opulence – so pleasant is the task of 
stigmatizing this insatiate cupidity – we have known of many manumitted 
slaves, since his time, much more wealthy than he ever was.28 
Meanwhile, Dio records, 
But Crassus, desiring for his part to accomplish something that involved 
glory and at the same time profit, and seeing that no such thing was pos-
sible in Syria, where the people themselves were quiet, and those who had 
formerly warred against the Romans were by reason of their powerlessness 
causing no disturbance, made a campaign against the Parthians. He had 
no complaint to bring against them nor had the war been assigned to him; 
but he heard that they were exceedingly wealthy and expected that Orodes 
would be easy to capture, because he was but newly established.29
Furthermore, Dio later offers a tale that the Parthians poured gold down Crassus’ 
throat, stating, “And the Parthians, as some say, poured molten gold into his mouth 
in mockery; for though a man of vast wealth, he had set so great store by money as to 
pity those who could not support an enrolled legion from their own means, regarding 
them as poor men.”30 Florus too records this tale, declaring, “The head of Crassus was 
cut off and with his right hand was taken back to the [Parthian] king and treated with 
mockery which was not undeserved; for molten gold was poured into his gaping mouth, 
so that the dead and bloodless flesh of one whose heart had burned with lust for gold 
was itself burnt with gold.”31 Meanwhile, Plutarch states, 
26 Vell. Pat. 2. 46. 2–3.
27 Jos. Bell. 1. 179; Jos. Ant. 14. 105–109, 119.
28 Pliny NH 33. 47. 134. See also Plut. Crass. 1. 2; 2. 1; 6. 5–7; 14. 4.
29 Dio 40. 12. 1.
30 Id. 40. 27. 3.
31 Florus 1. 46. 10.
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Now my own opinion is that the harm Lucullus did his country through 
his influence upon others, was greater than the good he did her himself. 
For his trophies in Armenia, standing on the borders of Parthia, and 
Tigranocerta, and Nisibis, and the vast wealth brought to Rome from these 
cities, and the display in his triumph of the captured diadem of Tigranes, 
incited Crassus to his attack upon Asia; he thought that the Barbarians 
were spoil and booty, and nothing else. It was not long, however, before 
he encountered the Parthian arrows, and proved that Lucullus had won his 
victories, not through the folly and cowardice of his enemies, but through 
his own daring and ability.32
Plutarch here emphasizes Crassus’ foolishness and greediness. He also, on the one 
hand, finds Lucullus’ incomplete command in the East regrettable but, on the other 
hand, praises Lucullus’ generalship at Crassus’ expense, even though Lucullus never 
encountered the Parthians in combat.33 
Certainly, Crassus stood to gain great wealth and fame if he defeated Parthia; 
however, his primary motivation was political advancement at Rome.34 A successful 
major military command had eluded Crassus. The military successes of Pompey in 
Spain and Lucullus in Anatolia had overshadowed Crassus’ efforts against Spartacus 
in the late 70s BCE.35 By 55 BCE Crassus wanted and needed to elevate his political 
standing in response to his growing rivalry with Pompey and the recent military suc-
cesses of Pompey and Caesar. The war against Parthia provided him with this oppor-
tunity.36 Therefore, the accumulation of military glory and wealth in the East was a 
means to an end, not the primary aim of Crassus’ command itself.37 If Crassus could 
have satisfied his political ambitions at Rome without a major war against Parthia, 
he likely would have done so since his lack of a military command in over fifteen 
32 Plut. Luc. 36. 6–7. See also id. Crass. 1. 2; 2. 1–2;  6. 5–7, 14. 4. For an account of the wealth 
Lucullus brought back to Rome, note id. Luc. 37. 3–4.
33 Note Plut. Luc. 36. 5–6. Here we find a good example of Plutarch’s rhetorical agenda in his 
moralistic lives. Plutarch meant for Lucullus to be a hero and for Crassus to be a cautionary tale. At the 
end of his depiction of Lucullus, Plutarch exaggerates his victory over Mithridates VI and Tigranes II and 
concludes that the gods considered him “noble” and “god-like.” Plut. Cim. and Luc. 3. 3–6. This certainly 
contrasts with the depiction of Crassus as impious and cursed by the gods. Note Plut. Nic. and Crass. 5. 2.
34 Florus is the only source that argues that Crassus took up the command in Syria because he was 
“eager for power (potentiae).” Yet he still argues that the prospect of more riches was the main motivation 
for Crassus. Florus 2. 13. 10–12. Ward (n. 3) 281; SeaGer, r.: Pompey the Great: A Political Biography. 
Malden 2002, 118–119.
35 Although Crassus served as consul alongside Pompey in 70 BCE, following the end of the Third 
Servile War, the people of Rome celebrated the military victories of Pompey. In fact, Crassus did not earn 
a triumph for his victory in the war; instead, he had to settle for a public ovation. Pompey became the 
leading man in Rome. Plut. Crass. 11. 7–12. 2; Appian BC 1. 120–121.
36 Ward  (n. 3) 281–282, 286–287, 293; BruNt, p. a.: The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related 
Essays. Oxford 1988, 83; LerOuGe (n. 3) 75.
37 This concept of not confusing the rewards of conquest with its actual motives of course runs 
parallel with the larger societal attitudes and motives of the Romans in war. See esp. GrueN, e. S.: The 
Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. 2 vols. Berkeley – Los Angeles 1984, 314.
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years demonstrates that Crassus was not particularly interested in warfare; however, 
the prospects of a Parthian expedition were too favorable in 55/54 BCE to overlook. 
Since Crassus had inherited the war, he was justified to pursue it. Moreover, the Roman 
alliance with Mithridates IV against Orodes II provided Crassus with a clear cause 
for war and made Parthia appear vulnerable, which made Crassus confident, perhaps 
overly confident, that he could quickly achieve his military and political goals against 
the Parthians.38 By portraying Crassus as blinded by greed, Roman writers could over-
look the political and military realities that Crassus faced in 55–53 BCE, which heavily 
influenced his decision to invade Mesopotamia, namely his political need to respond to 
the growing power and influence of Pompey and Caesar through a successful military 
campaign and the military need of the Roman state to conclude the open-ended war 
against the Parthians begun by Gabinius in 56 BCE. Instead, Roman writers could 
present Crassus’ moral failings of insatiable greed and hubristic irreverence as the 
“true” motivation behind and “true” explanation of Crassus’ failed campaign against 
the Parthians and thus protect the image of Rome. 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus emphasizes Crassus’ impiety, stating, “But the most 
remarkable and the greatest instance [of impiety] happened in my time when Licinius 
Crassus, a man inferior to no commander of his age, led his army against the Parthian 
nation contrary to the will of Heaven and in contempt of the innumerable omens that 
opposed his expedition.”39 Florus in his summary of Crassus’ Parthian expedition sim-
ilarly records, 
While in the north the Roman people by the hand of Caesar were conquer-
ing the Gauls, in the east they received a serious blow from the Parthians. 
Nor can we complain of fortune; for it was a disaster which admitted of 
no consolation. Both gods and men were defied by the avarice of the con-
sul Crassus, in coveting the gold of Parthia, and its punishment was the 
slaughter of eleven legions and the loss of his own life. For Metellus, the 
tribune of the people, had called down terrible curses on the general as he 
was leaving Rome; and after the army had passed Zeugma, the Euphrates 
swallowed up the standards, which were swept away by its swirling eddies; 
and when Crassus had pitched his camp at Nicephorium, ambassadors 
arrived from King Orodes with a message bidding him remember the trea-
ties made with Pompeius and Sulla. Crassus, who coveted the royal treas-
ures, answered not a word that had any semblance of justice, but merely 
said that he would give his reply at Seleucia. The gods, therefore, who 
punish those who violate treaties, did not fail to support either the craft or 
the valor of our enemies.40
38 In fact, Plutarch tells us that Caesar “wrote to him from Gaul approving of his project, and incit-
ing him on to the war.” Plut. Crass. 16. 3. Ward argues that Caesar hoped a victorious Crassus could help 
balance against Pompey’s power at Rome. Ward  (n. 3) 282.
39 Dion. Hal. 2. 6. 4. See also Val. Max. 1. 6. 11.
40 Florus 1. 46. 1–6.
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Appian also blends the two vices of greed and impiety together in his account, arguing, 
Crassus took Syria and the adjacent country because he wanted a war with 
the Parthians, which he thought would be easy as well as glorious and 
profitable. But when he took his departure from the city there were many 
unfavorable omens, and the tribunes forbade the war against the Parthi-
ans, who had done no wrong to the Romans. As he would not obey, they 
invoked public imprecations on him, which Crassus disregarded; where-
fore he perished in Parthia, together with his son of the same name and 
his army, not quite 10,000 of whom, out of 100,000, escaped to Syria. The 
disaster of Crassus will be described in my Parthian history.41
 
These examples further illustrate that the anti-Crassus propagandistic tradition blamed 
the cause of the war on Crassus’ greed and blamed the result of the war on his irreverence.
Unsurprisingly, Plutarch offers the most dramatic account of Crassus departing 
Rome on his way to Syria. Plutarch claims that, when the command of Syria fell to 
Crassus by lot, Crassus’ personality suddenly changed as he began to fantasize eagerly 
about conquering the entire Parthian Empire.42 Plutarch also claims that, because 
Crassus had no authority or cause for war against the Parthians, Gaius Ateius Capito 
planned to block his departure from Rome.43 Plutarch states, 
But Ateius, on meeting Crassus, at first tried to stop him with words, and 
protested against his advance; then he bade his attendant seize the per-
son of Crassus and detain him. And when the other tribunes would not 
permit this, the attendant released Crassus, but Ateius ran on ahead to 
the city gate, placed there a blazing brazier, and when Crassus came up, 
cast incense and libations upon it, and invoked curses which were dread-
ful and terrifying in themselves, and were reinforced by sundry strange 
and dreadful gods whom he summoned and called by name. The Romans 
say that these mysterious and ancient curses have such power that no one 
involved in them ever escapes, and misfortune falls also upon the one who 
utters them, wherefore they are not employed at random nor by many. And 
accordingly at this time they found fault with Ateius because it was for the 
city’s sake that he was angered at Crassus, and yet he had involved the city 
in curses which awakened much superstitious terror.44
Plutarch’s account is almost entirely theatrical fiction, which blames Crassus’ delusions 
and desires for the war and which has Crassus leave Rome under a cloud of ill forebod-
41 Appian BC 2. 18.
42 Plut. Crass. 16. 1–2.
43 Plut. Crass.  16. 3.
44 Plut. Crass.  16. 4–5. Plutarch found Crassus’ role in death equally theatrical. Note Plut. Crass. 
33. See also Polyaen. 7. 41. Pliny also argues that Crassus ignored a terrible omen. Pliny 15. 21.
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ing. Meanwhile, Cicero, who was a contemporary of these events, offers a much less 
theatrical version. He records that his brother Quintus said, 
‘We see what happened to Marcus Crassus when he ignored the announce-
ment of unfavorable omens. It was on the charge of having on this occasion 
falsified the auspices that Gaius Ateius, an honorable man and a distin-
guished citizen, was, on insufficient evidence, stigmatized by the then cen-
sor Appius, who was your associate in the augural college, and an able one 
too, as I have often heard you say. I grant you that in pursuing the course he 
did Appius was within his rights as a censor, if, in his judgement, Ateius had 
announced a fraudulent augury. But he showed no capacity whatever as an 
augur in holding Ateius responsible for that awful disaster which befell the 
Roman people [at Carrhae]. Had this been the cause then the fault would 
not have been with Ateius, who made the announcement that the augury 
was unfavorable, but with Crassus, who disobeyed it; for the issue proved 
that the announcement was true, as this same augur and censor admits. But 
even if the augury had been false it could not have been the cause of the 
disaster; for unfavorable auguries – and the same may be said of auspices, 
omens, and all other signs – are not the causes of what follows: they merely 
foretell what will occur unless precautions are taken. Therefore Ateius, 
by his announcement, did not create the cause of the disaster; but having 
observed the sign he simply advised Crassus what the result would be if the 
warning was ignored. It follows, then, that the announcement by Ateius of 
the unfavorable augury had no effect; or if it did, as Appius thinks, then the 
sin is not in him who gave the warning, but in him who disregarded it.’45
Quintus here still blames the disaster at Carrhae entirely upon Crassus for ignoring 
the “unfavorable augury”; however, there is no mention here or in Cicero’s letter that 
discusses Crassus’ departure from Rome of a public standoff between Ateius and Cras-
sus at the gates of Rome. This disparity between Cicero and Plutarch’s accounts led 
Sampson to conclude recently, “Again we see that the later ancient sources were all too 
eager to add dramatic elements to the story, especially one that made the defeat seem 
inevitable.”46 Indeed, the anti-Crassus tradition is quite dramatic, even in its early stage 
soon after the battle.
Cicero’s recorded discussion with his brother in 44 BCE is our earliest surviving 
evidence that the Romans used Crassus’ alleged impiety to discredit Crassus and to 
explain his failure, and in fact, the Romans quickly accepted the inevitability of Cras-
sus’ failure because of his moral failings. Cicero states, “Passing by men of earlier day, 
let us take Marcus Crassus. What advantage, pray, do you think it would have been 
to him, when he was at the very summit of power and wealth, to know that he was 
destined to perish beyond the Euphrates in shame and dishonor, after his son had been 
45 Cic. De Div. 1. 29–30.
46 SampSON (n. 3) 97.
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killed and his own army had been destroyed?”47 Moreover, Dio claims much later that 
after Crassus ignored innumerable bad omens his soldiers despaired and feared certain 
death, concluding, “At any rate, in all else that they did also, as if predestined to ruin 
by some divinity, they were helpless in both mind and body.”48 By focusing on Crassus’ 
irreverence and placing the defeat in the hands of destiny, later Roman writers could try 
to rid the Roman army and state of responsibility for the inevitable disaster at Carrhae. 
Thus, we see how total censure of Crassus’ moral character helped free the Romans 
psychologically from his military failure.
Such brutal criticism of Crassus demonstrates the extremeness of the anti-Cras-
sus propagandistic tradition, which remained popular into late antiquity and beyond.49 
For instance, Julian in the middle fourth century CE states, “I need not now remind 
you of ancient history, of Antony and Crassus, who were generals with the fullest pow-
ers, or tell how after long-continued dangers we succeeded in wiping out the disgrace 
they incurred, and how many a prudent general retrieved their blunders.”50 Meanwhile, 
Eutropius remarks, 
About the same time, in the six hundred and ninety-seventh year from the 
foundation of the city, Marcus Licinius Crassus, the colleague of Cnaeus 
Pompey the Great in his second consulship, was sent against the Parthians; 
and having engaged the enemy near Carrhae, contrary to the omens and 
auspices, was defeated by Surena, the general of king Orodes, and at last 
killed, together with his son, a most noble and excellent young man. The 
remains of the army were saved by Caius Cassius the quaestor, who, with 
singular courage, so ably retrieved the ruined fortune of the Romans, that, 
in his retreat over the Euphrates, he defeated the Persians [that is, the Par-
thians] in several battles.51
47 Cic. De Div. 2. 22. Soon after Cicero argues that Crassus surely would not have crossed the 
Euphrates if he knew the future. Cic. De Div. 2. 24. Later, Cicero remarks “When Marcus Crassus was 
embarking his army at Brundisium a man who was selling Caunian figs at the harbor, repeatedly cried 
out ‘Cauneas, Cauneas.’ Let us say, if you will, that this was a warning to Crassus to bid him ‘Beware 
of going,’ and that if he had obeyed the omen he would not have perished. But if we are going to accept 
chance utterances of this kind as omens, we had better look out when we stumble, or break a shoe-string, 
or sneeze!” Cic. De Div. 2. 84. Cicero concludes, “I recall a multitude of prophecies which the Chaldeans 
made to Pompey, to Crassus and even to Caesar himself (now lately deceased), to the effect that no one 
of them would die except in old age, at home and in great glory. Hence it would seem very strange to me 
should anyone, especially at this time, believe in men whose predictions he sees disproved every day by 
actual results.” Cic. De Div. 2. 99. Thus, Cicero casts serious doubts upon the reliability of divination; 
however, his arguments demonstrate that some Romans believed that Crassus had been warned by divinity 
and that by ignoring these warnings Crassus had sealed his fate.
48 Dio 40. 17–19.
49 Note the Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus’ discussion of Crassus’s failure and Cassius’ 
bravery in his ninth century CE work, The Chronogrophy. Note also Zos. 3. 23. 2; Hieron. Chron. 181.
50 Julian Or. 1. 17D.
51 Eutrop. 6.18.
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Although Eutropius appears to be one of the only Roman writers who acknowledges 
that Crassus “was sent against the Parthians (contra Parthos missus est)”, he still 
blames Crassus’ impiety and stubbornness for his failure and presents Cassius as an 
avenging savior.52 Moreover, Rufus Festus records, 
Crassus himself – when, after he had been enticed to a parlay, he was 
nearly captured alive – had escaped while his tribunes resisted, and, seek-
ing flight, was killed. His severed head, with his right hand, were borne 
to the [Parthian] king and then maintained for sport, so that molten gold 
might be poured into his throat: to wit, in order that he who, burning with 
lust for plunder, after he had been asked by the king to grant peace, had 
declined, flames of gold might consume his remains even after he perished. 
Lucius Cassius, Crassus’ quaestor, a vigorous man, gathered the remains 
of the scattered army. Against the Persians [that is, the Parthians], who 
were rushing toward Syria, he thrice contended in most admirable fashion 
and, after they had been repelled across the Euphrates, he ravaged them.53
Here Rufus Festus emphasizes Crassus perishing while trying to flee and stresses the 
punishment of Crassus even after death for his reckless aggression and avarice. Moreo-
ver, once again Cassius appears in another account as an avenging savior. Finally, note 
Orosius, who in the early fifth century CE wrote, 
In the six hundred and ninety-seventh year of the City, Crassus, who shared 
the consulship with Pompey, obtained by lot the command against the Par-
thians. He was a man of insatiable cupidity. When he heard of the riches 
of the Temple at Jerusalem that Pompey had left untouched, he turned 
aside to Palestine and came to Jerusalem, where he entered the Temple 
and plundered its treasures. Thence directing his course to Parthia he req-
uisitioned auxiliaries from the allied states, wherever his march led, and 
exacted tribute. As soon as he had crossed the Euphrates, he met Vageses, 
who had been sent as an envoy by Orodes, the king of the Parthians. Vag-
eses violently reproached the Roman for being led by avarice to cross the 
Euphrates contrary to the terms of the treaty of Lucullus and Pompey. He 
predicted that on account of this he would soon be burdened with Chinese 
iron instead of with Parthian gold.54
52 Note also Vell. Pat. 2. 46. 2; Plut. Pomp. 52. 3; Livy Epit. 105. 3; Orosius 6. 13. One Roman 
writer wrote, “The senate that gave laws to the tribes of the East, and the senate that dared to attack the 
Parthians – and would have conquered them, too, had not the fortune of Rome just then assigned our army 
so covetous a leader [Crassus].” HA Clod. 13. 6. This Roman author here puts forth the argument that the 
Roman Senate planned to conquer the Parthians. Therefore, the war was not Crassus’ idea; however, his 
covetousness turned the war into a disaster and ended Rome’s ability to subdue the Parthians.
53 Ruf. Fest. 17. 2–4.
54 Orosius 6. 13.
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Here again, according to Orosius, Crassus’ lust for riches drove him to war and blinded 
him to danger. Orosius soon after concludes, 
When this disaster of the Romans became known, many provinces of the 
East would have withdrawn from the alliance and protection of the Roman 
people, had not Cassius, after collecting a few of the soldiers who had fled, 
exercised exceptional spirit, courage, and moderation, and thus restrained 
Syria, which was then in revolt. Cassius killed Antiochus and defeated 
his mighty forces in a battle. He also fought the Parthians who had been 
dispatched by Orodes into Syria and who had recently entered Antioch. He 
drove them off and slew their leader, Osages.55
Orosius here exaggerates the dangers facing Cassius and his accomplishments in order 
to uphold the tradition of Cassius saving the Romans in the East and avenging Crassus’ 
blunder. Thus, we find ample evidence of a dramatic and propagandistic literary tradi-
tion that developed quickly and had a lasting influence concerning the role of Cassius 
and Crassus in the Carrhae campaign, where, although they were both Romans fighting 
the Parthians, Cassius emerged as the protagonist and Crassus emerged as the antag-
onist.56 The Roman writers made it abundantly clear with whom the Roman audience 
was supposed to empathize and support.
THE PARTHIAN RIVAL AND ROME’S DESIRE FOR VENGEANCE  
IN THE POST-CARRHAE WORLD
With the catastrophe of Crassus’ invasion, Rome failed in its initial attempt to establish 
unrivaled world empire, and Parthia suddenly emerged as a direct and legitimate threat 
to Roman hegemony. The costly but unsuccessful major military conflicts between the 
Romans and Parthians in the 40s–30s BCE helped solidify the new rivalry. Augustus 
found another costly invasion of Parthia unappealing and looked to a possible diplo-
matic solution to the Parthian problem. Augustan Age writers especially villainized 
Crassus in order to reinforce Augustan imperial propaganda concerning the new 
Roman relationship with the Parthians, which claimed that Augustus was the avenger 
of Crassus. For example, although he is a much later writer, Dio illustrates well how 
Augustus put this propaganda into action during his reign. Dio records, 
Meanwhile Phraates [IV], fearing that Augustus would lead an expedition 
against him because he had not yet performed any of his engagements, sent 
back to him the [Roman] standards and all the captives, with the exception 
of a few who in shame had destroyed themselves or, eluding detection, 
55 Orosius 6. 13.
56 Note also V Maccabees 41. 16–17, which dubiously claims Cassius avenged Crassus’ defeat by 
reclaiming Mesopotamia.
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remained in the country. Augustus received them as if he had conquered 
the Parthian [king] in a war; for he took great pride in the achievement, 
declaring that he had recovered without a struggle what had formerly been 
lost in battle. Indeed, in honor of this success he commanded that sacri-
fices be decreed and likewise a temple to Mars Ultor [that is, Mars the 
Avenger] on the Capitol, in imitation of that of Jupiter Feretrius [that is, 
Jupiter of Retribution], in which to dedicate the standards; and he himself 
carried out both decrees. Moreover, he rode into the city on horseback and 
was honored with a triumphal arch.57
Augustus’ diplomatic policy was a political risk because his avoidance of a military 
solution in the East potentially made Rome and his regime appear weak. However, 
Augustus was a masterful statesman, who used his imperial propaganda to manipulate 
the public perception of his nonviolent eastern policy against the Parthians. 
Augustus eagerly portrayed his diplomatic victory over Phraates IV in 20 BCE 
as an actual military victory over the Parthians, and it is telling that Augustus associ-
ated the returned standards of Crassus with his new temple to Mars the Avenger. Fur-
ther, Augustus’ most famous surviving statue, the Augustus of Prima Porta, portrays 
a youthful Augustus as a victorious imperator or commander in armor and military 
clothing, holding a consular baton and raising his right hand to address his trium-
phant soldiers, while Cupid, who is riding a dolphin and attempting to tug at Augustus’ 
toga, illustrates Augustus’ alleged familial connection to Venus.58 Augustus’ breast-
plate contains personifications of various defeated peoples and of the gods of the sky 
and earth. Yet the centerpiece of his breastplate is an image of a bearded Parthian, 
perhaps Phraates IV, surrendering a Roman legionary eagle to a Roman commander, 
perhaps Tiberius, who received the standards, or the personification of Mars Ultor, 
whom Augustus favored, or even the personification of Roma, flanked by an aggressive 
hound. Therefore, this statue was supposed to be a very public visual representation of 
Augustus’ “triumph” in the East over the Parthians and the establishment of Roman 
hegemony and the pax Romana throughout the entire world.59 The Augustus of Prima 
57 Dio 54. 8. 1–3. Note also Strabo 6. 4. 2; 16. 1. 28; Vell. Pat. 2. 91. 1; Suet. Tib. 9. 1; Eutrop. 7. 9; 
Orosius 6. 21.
58 Discovered in 1863 in the Villa of Livia at Prima Porta, most scholars believe the statue is a 
posthumous copy of a bronze original, ca. 20 BCE. Either Augustus’ wife, Livia, or his successor, Tiberi-
us, likely commissioned the copy after Augustus’ death since, although he is portrayed in military dress, 
he has the bare feet of a god instead of military boots. It also is unclear if the details of the breastplate 
accompanied the bronze original or were a later addition. Note WOOdFOrd, S.: The Art of Greece and 
Rome. Cambridge 1982, 85; zaNKer, p.: The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus. Trans. A. Shapiro. 
Ann Arbor 1988, 188; KLeiNer, F. S.: A History of Roman Art. Boston 2010, 68–69. 
59 Note FittSCheN, K.: Die Bildnisse des Augustus. In BiNder, G. (ed.): Saeculum Augustum III: 
Kunst und Bildersprache. Darmstadt 1991, 149–186; SimON, e.: Altes und Neues zur Statue des Augustus 
von Primaporta. In Saeculum Augustum III, 204–233; BOSChuNG, d.: Die Bildnisse des Augustus, Das 
römische Herrscherbild I . Berlin 1993, 179–181; rOSe, C. B.: The Parthians in Augustan Rome. Amer-
ican Journal of Archaeology 109 (2005) 21–75; Squire, m.: Embodied ambiguities on the Prima Porta 
Augustus. Art History 36.2 (2013) 242–279. For Augustus and the rhetoric of imperial peace, see Fuhr-
maNN, C. J.: Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers, Administration, and Public Order. Oxford 2012, ch. 4.
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Porta is only one example of a much wider artistic and literary effort during the Augus-
tan Age to utilize imperial propaganda to shape the imagery of the Parthians in order 
to mask Rome’s lack of military success in the East and the limits of its hegemony.60
An important part of this propagandistic imperial message was the humiliating 
failure of Crassus. Augustan Age writers helped reinforce the image of Augustus’ tri-
umph by portraying Crassus negatively. Quintus Dellius, who had been a subordinate 
of Cassius and Mark Antony but who betrayed Antony before the Battle of Actium 
and forged a close relationship with Augustus, wrote a history on the Romano-Par-
thian conflict during Augustus’ reign that became an important source for later writ-
ers, such as Strabo and Plutarch.61 From Dellius’ background and from the tone of 
Plutarch’s narrative, it is highly likely that Dellius was critical of Crassus. Meanwhile, 
Ovid, Propertius, and Horace found Crassus’ defeat disgraceful.62 Virgil longed for 
the Romans “to reclaim their standards from the Parthian [king]”.63 Moreover, Ovid 
writes, “But lo, Caesar [Augustus] makes ready to complete the conquest of the world! 
Ye far-off countries of the East, to our laws shall ye submit; and you, ye arrogant 
Parthians, shall be punished as ye deserve. Rejoice, shades of Crassus, and you, ye 
Roman Eagles, ashamed at your long sojourn in barbarian hands, be of good cheer, 
your avenger is at hand.”64 Unsurprisingly, an emphasis of the Augustan Age poets is 
that Augustus would finally right the wrong of Crassus. 
The Roman writers who followed shared similar feelings of embarrassment, 
frustration, and anger toward Crassus. Lucan, writing in the middle of the first century 
CE, blamed Crassus for seeking the Parthian war against the will of Rome.65 He also 
blamed Crassus’ death for the civil war between Caesar and Pompey.66 He states, 
Concord, on discord based, brief time endured, unwelcome to the rivals; 
and alone Crassus delayed the advent of the war. Like to the slender neck 
that separates the seas of Graecia: should it be engulfed then would the 
Ionian and Aegean mains break each on other: thus when Crassus fell, 
who held apart the chiefs [that is, Caesar and Pompey], in piteous death, 
and stained Assyria’s plains with Latin blood, defeat in Parthia loosed the 
war in Rome. More in that victory than ye thought was won, ye sons of 
Arsaces [the Parthians]; your conquered foes took at your hands the rage 
of civil strife. The mighty realm that earth and sea contained, to which all 
peoples bowed, split by the sword, could not find space for two [leaders].67 
60 Note SChNeider, r. m.: Friend and Foe: The Orient in Rome. In CurtiS, v. S. – SteWart, S.: 
The Age of the Parthians. Vol. 2: The Idea of Iran. London 2007, 50–86.
61 Strabo 11. 13. 3; Plut. Ant. 25, 59; Dio 49. 39; 50. 13. 8, 23; Jos. Ant. 14. 394; Jos. Bell. 1. 290; 
Sen. Suas. 1. 7; Sen. Clem. 1. 10. 1. Note also adCOCK, F. e.: Marcus Crassus, Millionaire. Cambridge 
1966, 59; SampSON (n. 3) 189.
62 Ovid Fasti 5. 583–585; Prop. 2. 10. 13–14; 4. 7. 83–85; Hor. Odes 3. 5. 5–12.
63 Virg. Aen. 7. 601–606.
64 Ovid Ars Am. 1. 177–181.
65 Lucan Phar. 3. 126.
66 Note also Plut. Pomp. 53. 6–7; Plut. Caes. 28. 1; Orosius 6. 14.
67 Lucan Phar. 1. 98–114. See also Lucan. Phar. 3. 265.
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Lucan was in fact so unwilling to accept the humiliation of Crassus’ defeat and the 
reluctance of the Romans to punish the Parthians that he criticized Caesar and Pompey 
for fighting each other instead of avenging the defeat at Carrhae.68 Lucan writes with 
frustration,
And the fates may seem to smile on Parthia; for the spouse of [Publius] 
Crassus [that is, Cornelia, whom then married Pompey], captive, shall to 
him [Orodes II] be brought [by Pompey, who considered fleeing to Parthia 
after Pharsalus in 48 BCE] as spoil of former conquest. If the wound dealt 
in that fell defeat in eastern lands still stirs thy heart, then double is the 
shame first to have waged the war upon ourselves, then ask the foe for 
succor. For what blame can rest on thee or Caesar worse than this, that in 
the clash of conflict ye forgot for Crassus’ slaughtered troops the venge-
ance due? First, united should Rome have poured her captains [Pompey 
and Caesar] upon the Mede [that is, Orodes II], and [been joined by] the 
[Roman] troops who guard the northern frontier from the Dacian hordes; 
and all her legions should have left the Rhine free to the Teutons [that is, 
the Germanic tribes], till the Parthian dead were piled in heaps upon the 
sands that hide our heroes slain; and haughty Babylon lay at her victor’s 
feet. To this foul peace [of Augustus] we pray an end; and if Thessalia’s 
day [that is, the Battle of Pharsalus] has closed our [civil] warfare, let the 
conqueror [Caesar] march straight on our Parthian foe. Then should this 
heart, [and] then only, leap at Caesar’s triumph won. Go thou and pass 
Araxes’ chilly stream on this thine errand; and the mournful [Roman] 
ghost pierced by the Scythian shaft [that is, Parthian arrows] shall greet 
thee thus: ‘Dost thou, to whom our wandering shades have looked for 
vengeance and for war, seek from the foe a treaty and a peace?’ And there 
profuse shall meet thee sad memorials of the rout: Red is yon wall where 
passed their headless trunks; Euphrates here engulfed them, Tigris there 
cast up to perish. Gaze on such array, and thou canst supplicate at Caesar’s 
feet in mid Thessalia seated.69 
Thus, Lucan contended quite passionately that Rome should have avoided civil war and 
ignored all other enemies of the Roman state in order to strike at the Parthians with the 
full might of the Roman army and, through slaughter and conquest, regained Rome’s 
68 Lucan Phar. 1. 11; 2. 526–554; 7. 431; 8. 91, 302, 327, 358, 394.
69 Lucan Phar.  8. 408–441. Note Plut. Pomp. 55. 1–2; 74. 3; 76. 6.
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dignity.70 Lucan especially believed it had been Caesar’s duty to punish the Parthians.71 
Lucan interestingly even chastises Augustus’ peace with Parthia and demonstrates that 
some Romans found Augustus’ nonviolent settlement with the Parthians unacceptable. 
In the post-Carrhae world, many Romans wanted someone to avenge Crassus’ 
defeat and thought this mission was important. Yet since Caesar died just before leav-
ing Rome to fight the Parthians, since Antony’s Parthian campaign also was a disaster, 
and since Augustus and his immediate successors avoided hegemonic war against Par-
thia, later Romans had to exaggerate earlier Roman efforts against the Parthians and 
to praise Roman “heroes” for punishing the Parthians.72 This helped create and sustain 
the tradition about Cassius becoming a savior hero in the late 50s BCE; however, it also 
established Ventidius as a savior hero for his defense of Syria in the late 40s and early 
30s BCE. In fact, Pliny the Elder claims, “Fortune was pleased that P. Ventidius alone 
should triumph over the Parthians”, and almost the entire literary tradition about these 
events agreed.73 
The importance of establishing Roman strength in the East and avenging mili-
tary setbacks remained a major priority throughout the imperial period. Late antique 
writers continued to praise emperors who avenged Roman military failures in the East. 
For example, a Roman biographer of Severus Alexander records that the emperor told 
the senate,  
‘We have captured many of the Persians and have sold them into slavery, 
and we have reconquered the lands which lie between the rivers [that is, 
the Euphrates and Tigris], those of Mesopotamia I mean, abandoned by 
that filthy monster [Elagabalus]. Artaxerxes [that is, Ardashir I], the most 
70 Dio records that during Augustus’ reign the conflict with Parthia overshadowed concerns with 
the Germanic tribes. Dio 55. 10a. 3. Meanwhile, Tacitus, who had a clear rhetorical incentive to exag-
gerate the threat of the Germanic tribes to Rome, argues that the Germans were a more worrisome and 
fearsome enemy than the Parthians because “German independence truly is fiercer than the despotism of 
an Arsaces”. Tac. Germ. 37. See also Tac. Ann. 13. 54.
71 Justin records that the Parthians believed Caesar planned to avenge Crassus. He states, “Not 
long after these occurrences the civil war among the Romans, between Caesar and Pompeius, broke out, 
in which the Parthians took the side of Pompeius, both from the friendship that they had formed with him 
in the Mithridatic war, and because of the death of Crassus, whose son they understood to be of Caesar’s 
party, and supposed that, if Caesar were victorious, he would avenge his father’s fate.” Justin 42. 4. 6.
72 Dio states, “But while Caesar was thus engaged, a longing came over all the Romans alike to 
avenge Crassus and those who had perished with him, and they felt some hope of subjugating the Parthi-
ans then, if ever. They unanimously voted the command of the war to Caesar, and made ample provision 
for it.” Dio 43. 51. 1. Appian records, “[Caesar] conceived the idea of a long campaign against the Getae 
and the Parthians. The Getae, a hardy, warlike, and neighboring nation, were to be attacked first. The 
Parthians were to be punished for their perfidy toward Crassus. He sent across the Adriatic in advance 
sixteen legions of foot and 10,000 horse.” Appian BC 2. 110. Appian also argues that it was Antony’s duty 
to avenge Crassus. Appian. BC 5. 65. See also Dio 49. 24. 5. Antony tried to demand the lost standards 
and captured soldiers of Crassus back from the Parthians. Plut. Ant. 37. 1–3. Note also Plut. Ant.  46. 3–4.
73 Pliny NH 7. 43. 135; Justin 42. 4. 7–10; Vell. Pat. 2. 78. 1; Plut. Ant. 33. 4; 34. 1–5; Dio 43. 
4–5; 49. 19–21; Tac. Hist. 5. 9; Tac. Germ. 37; Strabo 16. 2. 8; Jos. Bell. 1. 288–291, 309, 317; Jos. Ant. 
14. 392–395, 434; Florus 2. 19. 5–7; Livy Epit. 127. 4; 128. 2; Ruf. Fest. 18; Eutrop. 7. 5; Sid. Carm. 2. 
453–457; Orosius 6. 18; Juv. 7. 199–200. 
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powerful of kings, in fact as well as in name, we have routed and driven 
from the field, so that the land of the Persians saw him in full flight, and 
where once our ensigns were led away in triumph, there the king himself 
fled apace leaving his own standards.’74 
Although this is undeniably propaganda, here the Roman message was that Severus 
Alexander too had helped alleviate the stain of Crassus’ failure, which had remained a 
point of concern for centuries. 
Carrhae quickly became a Roman literary trigger that elicited the image of Cras-
sus’ failure and the disgrace that it brought upon the Roman state. For instance, Pliny 
the Elder in his description of the cities near the Euphrates refers to the city as “Car-
rhae, notorious for the disaster of Crassus”.75 Pliny illustrates that later Romans associ-
ated Carrhae directly with Crassus’ defeat. Therefore, Roman writers understood well 
what image the mention of Carrhae would provoke in their reader. In fact, the embar-
rassing Roman defeat at Carrhae remained so iconic even in late antiquity that authors 
often associated the city with later Roman invasions of Mesopotamia. For instance, 
there is a propagandistic account of Emperor Gordian III winning repeated battles 
against the Sassanid Persians, taking Carrhae, and establishing Roman dominance in 
the East.76 Another account states, “Now at once he [Saturninus Odaenathus, king of 
the Palmyrenes] proclaimed a war on the [Sassanid] Persians to exact for Valerian the 
vengeance neglected by Valerian’s son. He immediately occupied Nisibis and Carrhae, 
the people of which surrendered, reviling Gallienus.”77 Here the author criticizes Gal-
lienus for his failure to avenge his father and the reputation of Rome. Instead, in this 
passage an eastern rival of Gallienus brings further shame upon Gallienus by avenging 
the defeat of Valerian and indirectly, through the mention of the conquest of Carrhae, 
the defeat of Crassus.78 Note also that immediately preceding this passage the author 
criticizes the ridiculousness of a triumph of Gallienus, which featured men dressed as 
Persian captives in order to fool the crowd. The author records, 
One well-known instance of jesting, however, must not be omitted. As a 
band of Persians, supposed to be captives, was being led along in the proces-
sion (such an absurdity!), certain wits mingled with them and most carefully 
scrutinized all, examining with open-mouthed astonishment the features of 
every one; and when asked what they meant by that sagacious investigation, 
they replied, ‘We are searching for the Emperor’s father [Valerian].’79
74 HA Sev. Alex. 56. 5–7 (italics are mine).
75 Pliny NH 5. 21. 86.
76 HA Gord. 26.
77 HA Gall. 10. 1–3. See also HA Gall. 12–13. Aurelian also was praised for avenging the defeat 
of Valerian. HA Aurel. 41. 9.
78 Rufus Festus also criticizes Gallienus for his inaction, calls it “shameful” that Odaenathus had to 
defeat the Persians, and labels Odaenathus an “avenger of Roman imperium” for his victories. Ruf. Fest. 
23. 2. Note also Eutrop. 9. 10.
79 HA Gall. 7. 4 – 9. 8.
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The shameful defeat of Valerian, like the original disgrace of Crassus, grabbed the 
attention of Roman writers and audiences, who desired Rome’s emperors to avenge 
these military embarrassments in the East by force of arms.80 
Finally, the Gallic bishop Sidonius Apollinaris, writing in the fifth century CE 
as the Western Roman Empire crumbled, offers an interesting late antique Roman 
perspective on the disaster of Crassus and its implications for later Romans. In his 
panegyric on Anthemius, Sidonius created a dialogue between the goddesses Aurora 
and Roma. Sidonius has Roma assure Aurora that she has not returned to the East 
to conquer Armenia or the entire Parthian Empire.81 Roma continues, “All that lies 
between the Euphrates and Tigris thou hast long possessed alone; yet that possession 
was bought by me with the blood of Crassus; at Carrhae I paid down the price; nor did I 
remain unavenged nor lose the land thus bought; if my word is not good, Sapor [that is, 
Pacorus, son of Orodes II] hath proved it, slain by Ventidius.”82 Sidonius here has the 
embodiment of Rome argue that Crassus’ defeat purchased northern Mesopotamia for 
the Romans with blood and that his death required retaliation. Sidonius, following an 
over five-centuries-long propagandistic tradition, praises Ventidius for avenging Cras-
sus’ defeat at Carrhae.
FINAL THOUGHTS
The disaster at Carrhae scarred the Roman psyche and severely damaged the Roman 
ego. The memory of Crassus’ defeat and the frustration it elicited hung over the Roman 
consciousness for centuries, affecting much, if not all, of what the Roman tradition said 
about the Parthians as an eastern power and rival. Further, the Romans never forgave 
the embarrassing failure of Crassus against the Parthians. Roman writers universally 
placed all blame on Crassus for the defeat at Carrhae in an attempt to exonerate the 
Roman state from this catastrophe. Yet Crassus is a much maligned historical figure 
and victim of character assassination by later Roman writers. The Romans could nei-
ther accept the humiliation of the defeat at Carrhae, nor admit that the Parthians had 
earned their victory through military superiority. Instead, a widely accepted tradition 
of anti-Crassus propaganda emerged that ignored the geopolitical realities that led to 
the conflict, blamed Crassus’ greed for the disaster at Carrhae, and labeled him as an 
infamous example of unbridled Roman aggression, impiety, and military foolishness. 
Undoubtedly, Crassus’ campaign was a catastrophe, and Crassus had an impor-
tant part to play in this; however, we must place greater emphasis on the crucial role 
that the Parthians played in these events and stop blaming the defeat primarily on the 
alleged avarice or ineptitude of Crassus. Although the Romans clearly had several good 
reasons to distance themselves from the disaster at Carrhae, the seemingly universal 
bias of the sources against Crassus unfortunately still in many ways dominates our 
80 Rufus Festus calls Valerian’s defeat “disgusting”. Ruf. Fest. 23. 1.
81 Sid. Carm. 2. 436–452.
82 Sid. Carm. 2. 453–457. See also Sid. Carm.  9. 250–252.
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understanding of Crassus’ image and legacy and the contexts of the First Romano-Par-
thian War. Crassus’ demise lies at the center of one of the most popular and enduring 
of Roman literary traditions, and his name became synonymous with Roman defeat in 
the East.
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